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Abstract  
This paper uses state-level variation in the implementation of the 73rd amendment in 
India to observe the relationship between political reservations for women in local 
government and female child mortality. Nationally, reservations for women are not 
associated with a statistically significant difference in female child mortality. However, a 
state by state analysis shows variations in the level of impact of reservations on the topic 
of female child mortality. This paper examines the constraints on female representatives 
and their level of effectiveness in executing pro-female policies given the political and 
social environment. The two case studies on Kerala and Haryana explore women office 
holder’s abilities to administer public goods that favor women and children and the 
subsequent impact on female child mortality.    
 
Introduction  
A number of governments around the world have attempted to increase social 
development through the decentralization of power to local bodies. (The World Bank 
Report, 2001) A facet of this phenomenon includes the provision of representation of 
minorities and disadvantaged groups through reservations or quotas. This includes giving 
vulnerable groups a voice in decision-making and ideally improving the targeting of 
developmental programs. The World Bank claims that a greater number of women in 
government results in increased benefits for women and children. (The World Bank 
Report, 2001) One of the outcomes commonly tied to female empowerment is female 
child mortality. (Ram, 2010) This paper analyzes whether the staggered implementation 
of the 73rd  amendment in states between 1987-2007 and the subsequent increase in 
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women office-holders in India’s panchayats results in the execution of pro-female 
initiatives to affect female child mortality. This depends on whether local women leaders 
in India embody descriptive representation or substantive representation. The former 
focuses on actors’ characteristics, what they are, concentrating “on being something 
rather than doing something.” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 61) The latter is when actors advocate 
their constituents’ interests and make policy decisions that benefit one group or another 
among their clientele. (Mosher, 1968) For example, substantive representation would 
encompass women in government helping female children through cash transfers, 
increased access to education, or laws to improve the status of females in society. In 
India, excess female child mortality stems from a high son preference due to economic 
and social factors. This problem spans regions, religions, and socio-economic levels and 
is a developmental priority in the country. This paper focuses on the impact of women 
leaders on this development indicator and contributes to the literature on the impact of 
female representation in India. It is unique in its use of female child mortality as a proxy 
to fill the gap between descriptive and substantive representation of women in India. 
Additionally, the policy juxtaposition of two different states helps to further analyze the 
particular state-level differences in female representation and female child mortality. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 sets a historical background for 
the paper and introduces the 73rd amendment and India’s problem with female child 
mortality. Section 2 describes the relevant literature on the topic of female representation 
in India. Section 3 presents the data and explains the empirical strategy. Section 4 
describes the national level data and discusses the results and Section 5 describes state-
level data and analyzes policies in specific case study states. Section 6 concludes.  
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1. Background: India’s 73rd Amendment and Female Child Mortality  
1.1 The 73rd Amendment and Women’s Representation in India  
The passage of the 73rd amendment (Panchayati Raj) in 1993 in India has been acclaimed 
as an important step in the devolution of power to local governments. It established local 
governance at the rural level and local bodies at the village (panchayat), intermediate, and 
district levels with mandatory direct elections every five years. (Kalsi, 2017) The 
amendment was intended to further the administration of development programs at the 
local level and improve the efficiency of resource distribution through the process of 
decentralization. Additionally, the amendment mandated panchayats to have at least 33% 
reservation for women in the council and leadership as well as reservations for scheduled 
castes and tribes1. (Mohanty, 1995) Candidates for reserved seats would have to be 
nominated by their political parties and would also go through the process of campaigns 
and elections. (Duflo, 2004) The amendment required reservations to be randomly 
assigned to panchayats based on their serial registration number and female chairperson 
reservations to be rotated between panchayats every election cycle. (Mohanty, 1995)  
 The idea for this decentralization and women’s representation at the grassroots 
level came to fruition because of the failure of the panchayats to be effective 
administrators of public service in decreasing poverty and inequality before the 1990s. 
(Chaudhuri, 2003) The Indian Constitution included panchayats at its founding, but 
elections at this level were rare and the local level had no power of policy 
implementation. In most states, other than West Bengal, local elections had not been held 
regularly. Many elections were delayed either by non-governmental groups or by the 
                                               
1 Scheduled castes and tribes- groups of historically disadvantaged people in India (often seen as 
“untouchable”) and part of the lowest social sectors of Indian society (Duflo, 2012).  
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state government due to reasons such as civil unrest or natural disasters. (Duflo, 2004) 
There was a home-grown consensus of politicians and elites from either side of the 
political spectrum around the failure of the centralized strategy of the Indian 
developmental state. (Jain, 1996) Currently, even with the national decentralization to 
local governments, the level of power given to each local government varies and is 
dependent on the political characteristics of each state. (Chaudhuri, 2003) For example, 
in Haryana, the state bureaucracy continues to withhold funds from local governments 
and obstructs the implementation of local programs. (Chaudhuri, 2003) Though the 
amendment allows local governments to administer their own programs, this looks 
different in various states and has an effect on panchayats’ level of impact on the initial 
goal of furthering social development.  
The top-down approach of the 73rd amendment highlighted the Indian 
government’s need for development at the local level and its acknowledgment of the 
failure of current programs to improve rural lives. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
spearheaded the passage of the amendment and gave a speech in 1989 to promote a 
resurgence of focus on the Panchayati Raj. In this speech, he urged decentralization in 
order to strengthen democracy at all levels of government and for power to be given to 
the people instead of the elite power brokers. He defined these power brokers as the rich 
and those who derive power from the caste structure2. He argued that “We are on the 
threshold of a mighty revolution...It is a revolution that will bring democracy to the 
doorsteps of crores of Indians.” (Gandhi, 1989, p.2) Additionally, he wanted to pay 
special attention to women and scheduled castes, which he described as “the weaker 
                                               
2 Caste structure- A system that divides Hindus into hierarchical groups and has strict social implications. 
(What is India’s Caste System)  
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sections of society.” (Gandhi, 1989, p.2) Gandhi and other elites in power made the case 
that centralization was leading to the delayed implementation of programs on the ground, 
impeding economic development, and decreasing the effectiveness of poverty reduction. 
(Gandhi, 1989) The fact that the amendment was spearheaded by elites in parliament was 
beneficial because it was legitimized and had powerful national backing. However, there 
was no grassroots movement pushing for effective administration so states began 
implementation at different times and to different levels. Additionally, the lack of a 
grassroots movement meant that there was no ground-level push for substantive 
representation. Even though elites like Gandhi wanted to help the “weaker sections of 
society,” it was hard to hold them accountable for the implementation of concrete change. 
Therefore, it is helpful to test women’s abilities to participate effectively in order to 
analyze the level of true decentralization and empowerment of underrepresented groups 
initially promised by these elites. 
The national government used the 73rd amendment to revitalize local government 
and target development with reservations and decentralization. Proponents of the 
amendment realized biased perceptions deter socially disadvantaged groups from 
breaking into politics without any affirmative action policies, thus making reservations an 
important part of the new amendment. (Duflo, 2012) Reservations for women are 
important because men and women have different preferences, which result in a different 
allocation of public goods. Minority groups, like women, are likely to provide minority or 
low spillover goods such as transfers, rations, and water connections, which only benefit 
other women. (Duflo, 2004) The majority of men do not find any benefit from these 
goods and are less likely to invest in them. Without reservations, it is hard for women to 
  
Sharma 8 
have representation in government and provide these important minority goods. 
Additionally, political parties are less likely to field candidates from disadvantaged 
groups because they do not believe that they will win the majority vote. (Duflo, 2004) It 
was important for reservations to be included in the amendment in order to target the 
development of women and other minorities. As a result, after the first round of elections 
between 1993 and 1994, “almost 800,000 women were brought into local politics” in a 
country with no prior history of that level of women’s political participation. (Kalsi, 
2017, p.34) This thesis uses the fact that the legislation was implemented at varying dates 
across Indian states in order to test the effect of increased women’s representation on 
female child mortality.   
 
1.2 Female Child Mortality in the Indian Context  
Female child mortality is a continuing problem throughout India’s history and acts as an 
impediment to development and gender equality. Due to economic, social, and cultural 
norms, India is known to have a preference for boys, which results in a lower proportion 
of females ages 0-4 in relation to males. The main reason for this male preference is 
based on the economic benefits of having a son and the costs of having a daughter. In 
India, there is no social security system so parents look to their sons to ensure their 
futures and care for them in their old age. (Sen, 1990) Daughters are liabilities because 
they have to leave to another family once they are married and cannot take care of their 
parents. Additionally, they do not contribute economically to the family wealth and are 
costly because of the dowry system3. Sons are also able to pass down the family name 
                                               
3 Dowry system- The bride’s family must give the groom’s family cash, goods, or property as a condition 
for marriage (Sen, 1990)  
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and inherit family property and thus are assets both socially and economically. (Sen, 
1990) Overall, there has been a decline in fertility, but a rise in son preference, with 
various differences across regions and geographies in the nation. (Basu, 1999) This 
affects the female child in multiple aspects and can come into play in feticide rates, 
infanticide rates, and lack of access to basic facilities for young girls. Given similar 
health and nutrition, women are expected to live longer than men so the sex ratio should 
indicate more females than males at any age group. (Sen, 1990) However, the overall sex 
ratio in India has always been highly skewed in favor of men because most women and 
female children are not provided with the same level of care. (Premi, 2001) Since the rise 
of technology in the 2000s, there has been a decrease in female child mortality, but an 
increase in the overall child sex ratio, which can only be explained by an increase in 
prenatal sex selection. (Duflo, 2004) Technologies like the ultrasound and abortion 
methods have made it cheaper and more accessible for families to end an unwanted 
pregnancies. Although abortions are illegal in India, there are many black market clinics 
that people can use if they are able to afford them. These technologies allow families 
easier access to choosing the sex of the child in utero and are the catalyst for the 
substitution effect from postnatal to prenatal sex selection. (Duflo, 2012) Sex selection 
and child mortality are different indicators of the same topic of gender discrimination and 
are both important to understand in order to achieve the overarching goal of gender 
equality.  
 
2. A Gender Perspective on Politics: Political Reservation and Women’s Impacts on 
Policy-Making  
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2.1 Political Reservations in Panchayati Raj    
A number of studies have examined the costs and benefits of political reservations for 
disadvantaged groups, especially women. Many studies have seen great positive impacts 
of women’s reservations, while others have noticed unintended consequences such as a 
backlash against women in power. Even if there are women in government, the intended 
effect of the reservations to improve development for women, children, and society may 
not appear due to these negative unintended consequences. Therefore, it is important to 
test the impact of reservations to see their true effects in different contexts. 
 True equality would encompass a 50/50 ratio of men to women in government, 
but that is not true in many countries, including India, so there must be a mechanism to 
head in that direction. Over the period 1985-2007, “only 5.5% of state legislators in India 
on average were women” because there are many impediments to entering politics 
without reservations. (Iyer, 2012, p.8) The Goldberg paradigm explains how people of 
both sexes are more likely to rate someone’s work as lower quality if they think the 
person is a woman. (Pande, 2012) Consequently, in politics, some people vote for men 
because they associate them with higher quality candidates due to long-standing gender 
norms of what characteristics a leader should possess. Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 
argue that the gender gap in politics is due to the income gap and men can enter politics 
because they have the resources and abilities to do so. (Burns, 2001) Constantini argues 
that it is due to women’s general lack of political ambition and that women would rather 
take up other roles at home or in NGOs than enter the political scene. (Pande, 2012) 
There is a high cost of entry for women, which is accompanied with lower relative 
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benefits. They are often ridiculed and shamed and have a hard time passing their own 
policies in a patriarchal society. (Pande, 2012) 
  In India, reserved seats are kept for female candidates and allow for the direct 
regulation of the number of women in government. Those who are against the quota 
argue that these reservations crowd out other groups who are equally or more qualified to 
be in power. Reservations can be costly to society because potential women candidates 
are often less educated, have less experience and are less ambitious. (Pande, 2012) 
Lastly, these quotas may cause a social and political backlash of voters against women if 
people do not think that they deserve these seats. (Pande, 2012) Zipp and Plutzer also 
mention how strong female candidates win votes, while weak ones do not and it is more 
important to have an overall strong candidate than to regard their gender. (Zipp, 1985)  
Pro-quota advocates argue that reservations improve women’s representation so 
that they can have a say in politics. (Whitford, 2007) Men may not understand women’s 
basic needs and their policies will reflect men’s own preferences. If a percent of the 
population is not represented in government, its voice will not be heard and its 
preferences will not be prioritized. (Hirshman, 1970) However, Goldberg finds that the 
aforementioned taste discrimination against women decreases after two election cycles 
and this may reduce the need for quotas in the future. (Pande, 2012) This bias decreases 
over time and with increased exposure to female leaders, but it does not completely go 
away because of deeply ingrained male candidate preference. (Pande, 2012) 
Consequently, reduced discrimination makes backlash against women leaders obsolete in 
the long run. Also, women in power may have a role model effect on the aspirations of 
other women and this can create a cycle of more women entering into politics. (Beaman, 
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2012) Beaman observes that exposure to female leaders causes more parents to send their 
daughters to school and value education over housework. (Beaman, 2012) Increased 
political representation of women through reservations has a long term effect on women’s 
empowerment and gender bias reduction.  
 
2.2 The Impact of Women Office-Holders   
In India, women were brought into government with the goals of decreasing gender bias 
and targeting female development at the local level. This thesis analyzes the effects of 
political reservations for women on increasing their level of substantive representation in 
politics. In order to do this, I use changes in female child mortality rates as a proxy for 
women successfully or unsuccessfully applying pro-female policies in panchayats. Three 
main schools of thought surround the election of women office-holders and their political 
impact on human development and specifically pro-female policy preferences. This thesis 
uses Adrienne Smith’s definition of pro-female policies as “those that (a) improve 
women’s social, political, and economic status in relation to men, (b) address women’s 
unique needs related to their bodies and health, and/or (c) concern women’s traditional 
role as caregivers.” (Smith, 2014, p. 6)  
The first theory argues that women representatives do not actively pass pro-
female policies either due to cultural and social obstacles, structural impediments, or their 
own choices. (Mohanty, 1995) The Downsian model argues that a two-party, or in this 
case two-gender, system should converge to one platform for policies and a majority rule 
system will result in the outcome most preferred by the median voter. (Downs, 1957) In 
this case, the median voter in India is a male so candidates are more likely to pass 
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policies that benefit men. However, this theorem does not account for minority leaders 
refocusing policies on their own minority group once they are elected and do not need the 
majority vote. According to the political Coase Theorem, in the absence of transaction 
costs, “agents should agree to execute efficient policies regardless of the distribution of 
bargaining power among them.” (Galiani, 2014, p.14) Even if the reservation policy 
increases women’s bargaining power, the efficient policy choices will still be made and 
gender will not matter in the long run. This means that pro-female policies will only pass 
if they are effective, but will not be stressed by women office-holders if they are 
ineffective. Prasad also argues that women in India have more structural impediments in 
political positions due to familial and societal expectations, lack of access to training and 
experience, constituent stereotypes of gender roles, and low support from male 
colleagues. (Prasad 2009) Additionally, Manikyamba reports that women will be 
“unsexed” by participating in government and will have to embody primarily male 
characteristics in order to be taken seriously. (Manikyamba 1986) Due to deeply 
ingrained gender norms, people tend to value and vote for stereotypical male leaders. 
This does not leave much room for women to pass pro-female policies or advocate for the 
support of other women.  
A number of other studies make the argument that women in government hurt 
human development as a whole and pass policies that adversely affect certain groups. 
These theorists argue that women lack experience, education, and ambition when 
compared to men. (Dhaliwal, 2011) Dhaliwal finds that cash transfers to girls in India 
come at the direct expense of boys because the money is not spent on benefitting both 
genders, such as hiring new teachers or deworming everyone. (Dhaliwal, 2011) Bardhan 
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also finds that women panchayat leaders negatively affect public goods targeting of 
SC/ST groups. (Bardhan, 2009) However, this is only because they are not ingrained in 
the same capture clientelism networks as men. (Bardhan, 2009) Beaman also finds that 
after their second terms in office, females are even more likely than males to provide both 
male and female public goods. (Beaman, 2012) Additionally, Ban and Rao find that the 
difference between male and female experience in government disappears once females 
gain 1.3 terms of experience, thereby disproving the theory that females will always 
remain less competent than males. (Ban, 2008) Lastly, the human development theory 
argues that having women in political positions is an end goal in itself and simply their 
involvement raises the development and equality of society as a whole. (Sen, 2001) 
Consequently, the idea that women policy makers hurt society lacks explanatory value in 
the long run and it is apparent that they are more likely to support general development 
goals.  
 The last theory argues that women policy makers are more likely to consider the 
social good and provide a greater number of public goods and services for women. 
(Revenga, 2012) Beaman argues that women office-holders value certain public goods 
that tend to improve the lives of women and children such as water access, transfers, and 
rations. (Beaman, 2012) Male politicians are less likely to invest in these low spillover 
goods because they mainly target women and do not cater to the majority of voters. 
(Beaman, 2012) According to the non-unitary model of households, men and women tend 
to have different preferences, which are showcased based on the breakdown of 
bargaining power between household members. (Rode, 2011) If women gain more 
bargaining power in the household or in politics, they will better be able to pursue their 
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preferences. Additionally, studies show that women leaders are more responsive to 
women’s complaints because their preferences tend to align more closely and this is 
reflected in their policy-making. (Beaman, 2012) For example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
find that in West Bengal women complain more about water and roads and the women 
politicians invest more in those issues. In Rajasthan, where women complain more often 
about drinking water, women politicians invest more in water and less in roads. 
(Chattopadhyay, 2001) Additionally, Ghani describes how the increase of women office-
holders in India does not affect the overall employment of women in manufacturing but 
does cause an increase in more women establishing work in the informal sector. (Ghani, 
2014) Women leaders lower the cost of entrepreneurship of women by providing public 
goods and infrastructure and also inspiring women to start their own businesses. (Ghani, 
2014) In this case, increasing women’s representation does not have the intended effect, 
but creates unintentional change in another sector. It is therefore vital to observe both the 
intended and unintented consequences of women’s reservations in order to understand 
their total impact. Another hypothesis argues that increased female representation helps 
to specifically reduce female child mortality. This can be through the improvement of 
overall health care and survival rates for girls or by specifically targeting female child 
mortality. (Kalsi, 2017) However, women leaders may focus on empowering women 
through increasing access to abortion and contraceptives. Though this is “pro-female”, it 
may have the unintended consequence of increasing female sex selection. Although this 
thesis uses female child mortality and not female sex selection as the dependent variable, 
it is important to observe the unintended consequences of women’s representation on 
both of these topics. This thesis focuses on filling the gap between these conflicting 
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theories and coming to a conclusion about whether or not a greater representation of 
women in government decreases female child mortality. Current literature is varied on 
the subject and does not analyze the reason behind the differences between states. This 
thesis will focus on the national and state effects of the 73rd amendment on female child 
mortality as a result of increased descriptive representation of women at the local level.  
 
3. Data and Methods  
3.1 Methodology  
This research focuses on an empirical, analytical, and expository approach to addressing 
the research question of whether the passing of the 73rd amendment and the subsequent 
increase in women office-holders in India’s panchayats results in the implementation of 
pro-female policies and a shift in female child mortality rates. I operationalize the 
variable of the implementation of pro-female policies by looking specifically at the 
impact of women’s reservations on the proxy variable of female child mortality. There is 
a lack of available data on panchayat level policies passed by women leaders and most 
women leaders in panchayats are primarily responsible for the implementation of policies 
and distribution of funds to various projects. I observe changes in female child mortality 
to analyze women leader’s actions in what issues they prioritize and whether or not they 
are able to affect “a women’s issue” like female child mortality. I am able to identify the 
causal impact of reservations on female child mortality since the reservation status is 
randomly rotated among all Gram Panchayats. The empirical strategy is based on 
Lakshmi Iyer’s technique of applying state-level variation in the year of implementation 
of women’s reservations in India by election date. Some states executed the “not less than 
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one-third” political reservation for women before the 1993 amendment, others waited 
until the amendment was passed, and the last states did not implement it until the early 
2000s4. (Iyer, 2012) The timing of effective implementation is considered to be the first 
election in which this quota system was enforced. One reason for the varied timing is that 
some states were already in the midst of a political term and had to wait until the next 
election cycle to employ the reservations. Additionally, other states began reservations 
for women long before the amendment because they knew about the change that was 
about to happen. Lastly, a few states had legal problems, budgetary constraints, and 
exogenous factors that caused election delays until years later. (Iyer, 2012) Through this 
time variation, I conduct a difference by difference estimate on the impact of women’s 
representation on a specific human development indicator: female child mortality. Iyer et 
al. use this strategy to observe whether state-level implementations of reservations affect 
reporting of crimes against women. They found that having female political 
representation at the local level creates a strong positive effect on the number of women 
willing to report crimes. (Iyer, 2012) This thesis uses a similar strategy to see the effects 
of women’s political reservations on the variable of female child mortality. The 
dependent variable acts as a proxy for pro-female initiatives and indicates the level of 
women’s substantive representation at the local level in India. By observing changes in 
female child mortality, I analyze whether local women office-holders are able to 
administer policies and distribute funds to pro-female projects. In order to do this, I use a 
mixed method approach to analyze both quantitative data and qualitative case studies of 
states in India.  
 
                                               
4 Table 1: Dates of Panchayati Raj Implementation Across States in India  
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3.2 Data Collection and Empirical Strategy   
The main independent variable in the set is the date of the first effective election with 
women reservations in each state and the dependent variable is female child mortality5. 
This data comes from many different sources, which are summarized in the Appendix. 
Most of the data for the year of reservations is gathered from the Election Commission of 
India and the various State Election Commissions. I also account for other variables that 
may inadvertently affect the results such as changes in fertility6, birth rates7, male child 
mortality8, population9, Gross Domestic Product10, literacy rates11, and monthly per 
capita expenditure12. The main independent and dependent variables are isolated by 
accounting for these exogenous variables in the regression model.  
 I obtained data on these indicators for the period 1987-2007 from various surveys 
and datasets created by different offices in the Government of India13 and NGOs. These 
include the Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, the 
Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, The World Bank, and the Reserve Bank of India. The data comes from reports 
such as the Sample Registration System Statistical Report, State Human Development 
Report, Family Welfare Statistics, District Level Household and Facility Survey, Census 
                                               
5 Figure 1: Nationwide Trends in Female Child Mortality (1987-2007)  
6 Average number of children born to one woman in a lifetime (Indian Census, 2011)   
7 The number of live births per 1000 of population per year (Indian Census, 2011)  
 
8 Number of male deaths per 1000 live births of children under 1 year of age (Indian Census, 2011)  
9 Number of people in the state  
10 Monetary measure of the market value of all final goods and services produced in that year. This is 
calculated using constant prices from 2004-2005 and is written in crores. (Indian Census 2011)  
11Literacy rates- total percentage of the population of an area at a particular time aged seven years or above 
who can read and write with understanding. (Indian Census 2011)  
 
12Average per capita expenditure in rupees per person in one month (Indian Census 2011)  
13 These are all included in the Appendix: Data Sources   
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Reports, Central Statistics Office Reports, Economic Surveys of India, and World Bank 
reports. In my regression model, I include year fixed effects to account for changes that 
affected all places in a specific year.   
 Additionally, I control for other factors that may affect female child mortality. I 
include whether the Chief Minister in the state was a woman at the time in order to 
isolate local level female political participation instead of state-level female 
representation. Also, the local governments have women pradhans, or chiefs, during 
different election cycles and that might affect policy-making differently than women in 
council positions. However, this thesis looks at the overall increase of women and does 
not need to specify which position they take in each body of government. Some states 
also recently decided to increase the political reservation of women to 50% instead of the 
initially required one-third. Some of these states include Bihar, Uttarakhand, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh. (Prasad, 2014) The increase in reservations has no effect 
on this thesis because I focus on the initial increase of women with the original passage 
of the amendment.  
Lastly, I analyze the political and social environment for policymaking in a state 
with low gender bias and a state with high gender bias. States such as Haryana and 
Punjab historically have high female child mortality rates and others like Kerala have 
successfully worked towards decreasing child mortality. (Bose, 2001) I qualitatively 
analyze benefits and constraints of the environment for women in each state and the 
relationship of these differences to female child mortality.  
The empirical strategy provides a multi-faceted approach to the question and 
includes both quantitative data and qualitative case studies. The quantitative data is not 
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enough by itself because it uses female child mortality as a proxy for women leaders’ 
ability to further pro-female causes. The case studies further flush out the data and 
analyze concrete policy implementation to observe what has and has not changed on a 
state level after reservations. It is also important to isolate each main independent and 
dependent variable by controlling for exogenous factors that could affect female child 
mortality rates. In order to do this, I draw a direct correlation between the timing of the 
political reservations, the increase in women office-holders, and the impact on female 
child mortality. In order to draw this comparison, I look at multiple datasets over time 
and reinforce them with literature that is relevant to the findings. I hypothesize that 
women office-holders want to implement pro-female policies and have a positive effect 
on female child mortality, but they are constrained by their social and political 
environments in reaching their desired outcomes. The final result of women’s 
reservations is ambiguous due to these constraints on women, so it is important to test the 
results on indicators like female child mortality in order to analyze whether female 
office-holders are able to create substantive change in that issue.  
 
3.3 Data: Analysis of the Model   
I conduct the analysis for 1514 major states in India over the time frame 1987 to 200715. I 
drop states that were excluded from the purview of the amendment16 and others that 
                                               
14 Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal 
15 Table 2: Summary Statistics   
16 Meghalaya, and Nagaland, Mizoram 
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lacked sufficient data17. In order to find the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, I run state-level regressions of female child mortality rates based on 
the year of implementation of the 73rd amendment. The regression equation is the 
following:  
 
Mst = as + βt + fRst + d’Xst + εst 
 
The variable Mst is the number of female children (ages 0-4) who died out of the mid 
year population of female children in that age group in s state in year t. βt is a fixed effect 
for year t, Rst is a dummy variable with 0 and 1 standing for years before and after the 
first election with political reservations for women in state s and year t. Xst is a set of 
state control variables including population, literacy rates, average MPCE, the presence 
of a female chief minister, fertility, and male infant mortality. The coefficient f captures 
the effect of political reservations for women on the dependent variable of female child 
mortality.  
 I control for differences between states by accounting for various characteristics 
that may affect female child mortality. According to the literature, female child mortality 
is affected by variables such as education, economic growth, population, and the general 
level of wellbeing. (Iyer, 2012) The variables literacy rates, population, and MPCE 
account for these characteristics. (Iyer, 2012) Fertility rates and male mortality account 
for whether female child mortality is an isolated problem or whether overall child 
mortality is the problem. Lastly, I control for whether the Chief Minister in each state in 
                                               
17 Jammu & Kashmir, Goa, Uttarakhand, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Chhattisgarh, Sikkim, 
Jharkhand, Telangana  
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each year was a woman in order to make sure that the political representation for women 
at higher levels is not diluting my analysis of political representation of women at the 
local level.  
  The regression itself uses panel data in order to assess the behavior of the 
variables across a set of years. It controls for variables that are unobservable or 
immeasurable such as cultural factors, differences between states, or variables that 
change over time but not across states. The fixed effect of the regression isolates the 
impact of the variables over time and accounts for factors within the states or years that 
may impact or bias the outcome variable. The fixed effect removes the effect of those 
time-invariant characteristics in order to assess the net effect of the predictors on the 
outcome variable.  
 
4. National Level Results and Discussion   
4.1 National Level Results: Effect of Reservations on Female Child Mortality  
I find that political reservations for women in this model do not have a significant impact 
on female child mortality rates. Table 3 shows the results of the relationship between 
each independent variable and the dependent variable of female child mortality. The 
coefficient18 for reservations and female child mortality is small and statistically 
insignificant, which shows no important relationship between the year political 
reservations were made in each state and the impact on female child mortality.  
 However, there are correlations between female child mortality and other 
variables included in the regression19. It is important to control for these variables 
                                               
18 Coefficient: 0.212  
19 Table 3: Women’s Political Reservations and Female Child Mortality in India  
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because they impact female child mortality. Once they are controlled for, it is easier to 
see a truer impact of reservations on female child mortality. There is a statistically 
significant and negative correlation20 between literacy and female child mortality. As 
literacy increases, female child mortality decreases. Additionally, the relationship 
between female child mortality and monthly per capita expenditure21 is also significant 
and slightly positive. This shows that as people increase their wealth and consumption, 
female child mortality also increases. There is also a statistically significant and positive 
correlation between fertility and female child mortality22. As people have more children, 
there is a greater rate of female child mortality. Lastly, there is a slight positive 
correlation between male infant mortality and female child mortality23. Even though this 
model does not show any significant relationship between reservations and female child 
mortality, it does illustrate correlations between other variables and female child 
mortality. This is important in formulating a better idea about the various layers that 
affect female child mortality and isolating reservations as the main independent variable 
in the analysis.  
 
4.2 Discussion: National Level Substantive Representation of Women  
On a national level, the data in this model shows no statistically significant relationship 
between reservations for women and female child mortality. However, the data does 
show relationships between female child mortality, education, fertility, and economic 
growth. There is much discussion on the topic of political reservations and whether they 
                                               
20 Coefficient: -0.248 
21 Coefficient:0. 0026 
22 Coefficient: 1.95  
23 Coefficient: 0.26 
  
Sharma 24 
provide descriptive (women’s presence in politics) or substantive (the active promotion 
of women’s interests) representation of women. (Franceschet, 2008) In India, local 
women are able to make an impact in the political process with their presence, but have a 
hard time producing outcomes on a scale that can impact the national level data in the 
context of female child mortality. (Smith, 2014) The model’s results can be explained by 
the administrative and environmental constraints that are placed on women leaders in 
India as well as their lack of agency in being able to implement and fund significant pro-
female initiatives. Female child mortality outcomes act as proxies for policy 
implementation and indicate the level to which women have the freedom to follow their 
preferences. Additionally, the model itself is limited in its scope due to its observance of 
state-level data that might dilute the work of women at the local levels. Some women 
panchayat leaders are successful in implementing their preferences and others are not 
able to accomplish any change. State-level data cannot separate these results and the 
work of each individual woman leader is diluted when included with the mass number of 
women.   
 Reservations are expected to provide women with access to a political voice and a 
say in how the government is run. However, women’s entry and impact on policies are 
often barred by issues such as gender bias, lack of access to basic education and training, 
lack of support by family and colleagues, and an unfriendly legal structure. (Chowdhury, 
2002) Specifically in India, many women are often reduced to figureheads and are stand-
ins for male relatives who make all the decisions. (Nanivadekar, 2006) These quota 
women may also be stereotyped as less experienced and less autonomous, which 
negatively affects voter’s perceptions. (Franceschet, 2008) Most areas in India are also 
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highly patriarchal with male heads of households who do not want to see any change in 
the division of labor or gender roles. (Sen, 1990) Consequently, these men do not want 
women leaders to have any resources for effective participation that may lead to the 
passing of policies that will change the status quo. (Kalsi, 2017) Additionally, 33% 
reservation for women at the local level may not be enough to make an impact on data at 
the state level. Some women in panchayats may be able to implement pro-female 
policies, while others have more constraints and cannot administer their own programs. 
Thus the state-level data is highly aggregated and cannot accurately portray the struggles 
and successes of every woman panchayat leader. Even with 33% representation, women 
are still the minority in government and men are still able to pass policies according to 
their own preferences. Additionally, women newly introduced into politics do not have 
the same networks and ties to political clientelism that experienced men tend to exploit. 
(Bardhan, 2010) Women lack relationships with village elites and district level officials 
and are not able to use political contacts to have more of a say in policymaking. 
(Bardhan, 2010) It is, however, worth noting that the women’s reservations allow women 
to gain self-confidence and for the general voting population to become more receptive 
towards women leaders over time. This may lead to women having more of a say in the 
future and greater positive targeting impacts in the long run. (Beaman, 2012)  
 The limited scope for political participation available to women is reflected in the 
fact that few women expect to be elected without reservations. (Jafar, 2013) The same 
seats are not reserved for every election cycle, so it is hard for women to overcome social 
and administrative challenges in order to win the same seat multiple times in a row. 
(Jafar, 2013) Thus women leaders are unable to strengthen the networks, skills, and other 
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mechanisms needed to develop effective leadership abilities. The analysis is also 
muddled by the fact that women leaders may want to increase access to abortion facilities 
and contraceptives in order to empower women to make their own choices. This is 
technically “pro-female”, but it may result in an increase in female sex selection, which 
complicates the analysis on this topic. Prenatal sex selection is different from female 
child mortality, but it is important to understand the effects of reservations on both terms 
because they are interrelated and part of the same overarching problem of gender 
discrimination.  
 Along with social challenges, women in India also face larger scale administrative 
problems. Between 1987 and 2007, there was only an average of 8% women in India’s 
National Parliament, which shows a gender bias in higher up political government where 
much of the policymaking occurs. (World Bank Data) In terms of Panchayati Raj, India 
was a fast track country that implemented quotas almost overnight and did not wait for a 
cultural change or push towards equality. Any feminist or grassroots movement did not 
accompany the reservations, so there was limited ground-level demand for them to be 
implemented in a way that benefitted women rather than the administration in power. 
(Nanivadekar, 2006) Additionally, panchayat funding and large policymaking are still 
controlled by individual states, which are dominated by males. (Jain, 1996) This leads to 
primarily male preferences included in state-level policies, which panchayats have to 
implement at the local level. Many panchayats also have committees for various sectors, 
but since there are no quotas for committees, they are used as a way of excluding women 
from the decision-making process. (Jayal, 2006)  
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 There also may be limitations with the model itself, which make it hard to see the 
direct effect of women’s reservations on female child mortality at the local level. The 
data is only available on a state level and may be too aggregated to show an impact of 
women’s reservations at the local level. Additionally, there is much literature on women 
leaders gaining effectiveness and success in passing policies after two terms in office, but 
these reservations are rotational and the data does not focus on the long-term of women 
representatives in local bodies. (Beaman, 2012) In the long term, women are known to 
become more strategic, form elite networks, and make more informed and experienced 
decisions. However, it is hard to see these long-term effects when looking at a small time 
period of 20 years. Also, politics in rural India is slow and takes time to have an effect so 
the model might have to look at longer periods of female participation to see a shift in its 
impact. (Gleason, 2001) Lastly, I only look at female child mortality to indicate the 
effects of reservations on womens’ abilities to pass pro-female policies, but results may 
vary with the use of a different proxy variable.  
 
4.3 Discussion: Female Child Mortality and Control Variables  
Although the model does not show a significant relationship between women’s 
reservations and female child mortality, it does show a relationship with other 
independent variables. It is important to control for these variables because they impact 
female child mortality. Once they are controlled for, it is easier to see a truer impact of 
reservations on female child mortality. Without understanding the relationship between 
these variables and the dependent variable, there is no way to have an accurate analysis of 
the impact of reservations. According to the literature on the subject, the presence of 
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women representatives has increased the self-esteem and confidence of other women and 
given them the chance to voice their complaints and ideas. (Chattopadhyay, 2004) 
Women often deal with on the grounds issues at the local level and work with NGOs on 
topics such as water access, family and matrimonial matters, children’s education, and 
land disputes. (Jayal, 2006) Women leaders stress the importance of female education 
and raise the aspirations of girls and their parents with a role model effect. (Beaman, 
2012) According to the data, increased literacy results in decreased female child mortality 
and individual female panchayat members play a large role in the increased education of 
the girl child. (Jayal, 2006)   
 There is also a positive relationship between monthly expenditure per capita, 
which can be used as a characteristic of economic growth, and female child mortality. 
Economic development overall results in lower women’s status relative to men’s due to 
“the undermining of women’s traditional roles or the disproportional increase in men’s 
entitlements in relation to women’s.” (Miller, 2001, p.34) Additionally, due to the rise of 
sex selective abortion methods in the 1990s, the combination of access to new 
technologies and a rise in the wellbeing of households led to increased pre and postnatal 
sex discrimination. (Duflo, 2012) This can be shown through the changes in sex ratios at 
birth24. For example, a district-level study in Maharashtra found that wealthier districts 
such as Mumbai and Pune reported both a larger number of such abortion facilities as 
well as more distorted sex ratios than did such poorer districts. (Nagarajan, 2008) 
 The last two variables of male child mortality and fertility are both also positively 
correlated with female child mortality. In terms of fertility, a preference for sons may 
result in increased fertility as people attempt to achieve their preference and get rid of 
                                               
24 Figure 2: Nationwide Trends in Sex Ratio at Birth  
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unwanted females through neglect or infanticide. (Sudha, 2003) Male child mortality also 
increases slightly as female child mortality increases. This positive relationship goes to 
show that areas of low resources for mothers and children may result in high mortality all 
around. These can be places with low hospital attendance, lack of healthcare, and few 
resources to care for children. (Bhalla, 1995) For example, less than 2.5% of all births in 
rural parts of Haryana take place in a hospital and it is also one of the states with high 
rates of child mortality. (Bhalla, 1995) 
 
5 State-Level Results and Case Studies   
5.1 State-Level Results: Female Child Mortality Rates Before and After Reservations 
Specific states had varying levels of changes in female child mortality before and after 
reservations. I calculated the average female child mortality rate for each state for the 
years before and after reservations were implemented and then analyzed the percent 
change in those numbers. The results are summarized in Table 4 for each state. 
According to the literature on this topic, Kerala is a state with low child mortality and a 
strong emphasis on improving the lives of women. (Sen, 1990) The results show that 
Kerala already had a low average female child mortality rate of 5.54 before reservations 
and was able to bring it down even further to 2.91, thereby having a 47.5% decrease. This 
is the greatest percent improvement out of all of the states.  
 On the other hand, Haryana is one of the states with a history of high female child 
mortality and gender bias. (Sen 2001) The results show that Haryana had a high female 
child mortality rate of 27.58 before reservations and only managed to decrease female 
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child mortality by 18.5% after reservations. After Bihar, this is the lowest percent change 
in female child mortality pre and post reservations.  
 My analysis is confounded by the fact that with the rise of technology, people 
started to move to sex selective abortions, especially in rich communities. This is 
important to note when looking at female child mortality because sex selective abortions 
may be substituting child mortality, but there is no counter for that in the results. Even if 
there is a decrease in child mortality in both states, there may be a rise in female sex 
selection, which is outside the purview of this paper but important to keep in mind.  
 
5.2 Case Study: Panchayati Raj in Kerala   
Although the national level data does not show a significant relationship between 
reservations and female child mortality, the data for each state is less aggregated and 
provides more input into the impact of reservations. This thesis has been using the proxy 
of female child mortality to analyze political power given to women representatives 
because data on policy change at the local level is not readily available. These case 
studies give a better perspective on how women are affecting policy change and whether 
or not they are successful in reducing female child mortality.  
 Kerala is located in the southern region of India and is known to be a state with 
matriarchal values and relatively less gender bias in comparison to other states. The 
government of Kerala passed the Kerala Panchayati Raj Act in 199425, which called for 
no less than 33% of seats reserved for women in all levels of local government. 
(Chowdhury, 2002) The state has a history of property inheritance through the female 
family line as well as a high level of communal medicine, which helps disadvantaged 
                                               
25 Figure 3: Kerala Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Reservations 
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groups such as women have a higher chance of survival. (Sen, 1990) Additionally, the 
total literacy campaign run by the state in the late 1980s increased levels of education for 
females in all parts of the state and provided them with educational empowerment. 
Compared to the rest of India, Kerala has a high level of literacy, better status for women, 
and more qualified women representatives. (Sen, 1990) However, this level of education 
and status is still low when compared to that of men in Kerala.  
 After the passage of the Panchayati Raj Act, the government of Kerala passed a 
development program called the People’s Campaign for the Ninth Plan. The Plan 
Campaign in 1996 brought more women who were usually excluded from political life 
into Kerala’s local government bodies and allowed women leaders to implement policies 
that impacted pro-female issues such as female child mortality. (M.S., 2002) For the first 
time, women were included as partners in the developmental program and not just 
beneficiaries. The plan itself called for a greater emphasis on the impact of gender in 
policy-making, greater participation of women in Gram Sabha, and at least 10% of the 
state budget to go to women’s projects. (M.S., 2002) Two important projects for women 
came out of this campaign: one was to organize women in self-help groups  (SHGs) 
called Kudumbasree and the other was to help rural women and children through the 
Angavadies or child care centers. (Women Development, 2003)  Kudumbasree was 
formally known as the women poverty eradication program, which organized 
Neighborhood Groups (NHGs) of women for empowerment and resource provision. 
After the rise of the NHGs, there was further decentralization of governance to the sub-
gram sabha level called Ayalkoottam, which gave women more opportunities to interact 
in the political sphere. (Chowdhury, 2002) 
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 In Perambra panchayat, these groups run by women leaders helped other women 
move away from agriculture to diversifying their output. The groups also helped women 
market their new products in order to economically and socially empower these women 
entrepreneurs. (Mathew, 2013) Additionally, in Kanjikuzhy panchayat, the neighborhood 
groups helped move women from a dependence on fishing to joining in the production of 
umbrellas. This diversification allowed women to not only be financially stable and 
independent but empowered them in society, thereby increasing the value of females in 
society and helping decrease female child mortality. (Mathew, 2013) Women like 
Kanniyamma Sreerangan, the president of a tribal gram panchayat in India, work towards 
implementing community-specific projects to further development. Sreerangan began an 
initiative to “provide solar panels, batteries, and lights to all 240 families in the 
panchayat.”(Shaji, 2014, p.3) She mentioned that before the reservation, her community 
was male-dominated and she was discouraged from entering public places such as 
meetings of elders to decide on community affairs. Due to political reservations for 
women, she claimed that “we, seven women in the panchayat, have started rewriting 
history.”(Shaji, 2014, p.4) Her goal was to not only provide her community with the 
necessary resources, but to also increase the value of the girl child. Sreerangan and other 
like-minded woman panchayat leaders want to create a space where families do not feel 
the need to practice female child mortality for social or economic reasons. (Shaji, 2014). 
They are also working to improve education and reduce fertility, which are 
aforementioned variables that have a relationship with female child mortality rates.  
 Although Kerala has created a space for women to function and pass policies 
through further decentralization and self-help groups, there are still problems remaining 
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in the state. There has never been more than 10% women in the state assembly and many 
of these women are of an elite class and cannot understand the problems of rural women. 
(Chowdhury, 2002) The results of a 2002 survey in Kerala panchayats showed that only 
“16% report that they have to deal with women’s issues, 9% deal with children’s issues, 
and 10% say that they felt supported by their male colleagues.” (Chowdhury, 2002, p.14) 
The support system for women in government needs improvement and women need to be 
equipped with the right skills and training. Additionally, many elected women 
representatives are not informed about panchayat meetings and are barred from taking up 
women’s issues by their political party. (Chowdhury, 2002) Political parties are 
responsible for fielding candidates and can informally control their candidate’s policy-
making or preferences in order to be in line with their own platform. (Chowdhury, 2002) 
Due to the development program and self-help groups, women in Kerala are given more 
resources and political freedom than their counterparts in other Indian states. This results 
in a decrease in female child mortality but does not mean that they share equality with 
men in the political sphere. If they attempt to leave their gender roles in order to enter 
politics, they are often met with much of the same ridicule, bias, and stereotypes that 
women in other parts of India face.  
 
5.3 Case Study: Panchayati Raj in Haryana  
Unlike Kerala, the state of Haryana has a highly patriarchal history where men control 
both the public and private spheres. It is one of the richest states in India, yet trickle-
down economics does not work and there is great inequality between sexes and classes. 
(Sen, 1990) During the last census in 2011, Haryana had the lowest child sex ratio at 834 
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females per 1000 males. (Jejeebhoy, 2015) The data in the model also shows that 
reservations led to less than 20% decrease in average female child mortality, which is a 
much smaller difference than in most other states26. 
 Several previous studies have found constraints on women representatives in 
Haryana that have impeded their progress in policymaking and reducing gender bias. A 
study by Rekha Chaudhary “revealed that most of the elected women representatives 
have not been empowered because of a lack of education, awareness, and confidence.” 
(Lohumi, 2013, p.35) Due to this lack of empowerment, they have not been able to 
change the status quo and decrease the prevalence of female feticide and infanticide. The 
Buch study concluded that out of the women representatives surveyed in Haryana, “40 
percent of the women representatives belonged to families with incomes that place them 
below the poverty line; 14.2 percent of them were landless, 19.5 percent had marginal 
holdings and 20.6 percent had small farm holdings.” (Buch, 1999, p. 23) Many of these 
women are poor and lack the financial flexibility to spend their time and energy on 
politics. Additionally, many of the women’s election campaigns are run by the men of 
their family and allow for the empowerment of those men instead of the intended women. 
These women are neither economically nor politically empowered and lack the support 
and training needed to succeed in their positions. (Jayal, 2006) Lastly, in a survey by 
Chander, Kumari, and Singh, 33.13% of the elected women members did not have full 
information about the Panchayat budget and how it could be used, which indicates the 
severe lack of information given to women leaders in their positions. (Chander, 2013)  
 There are also administrative and institutional problems with Haryana’s 
Panchayati Raj that act as constraints on women’s power. In many of the villages in 
                                               
26 Figure 4: Haryana Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Reservations  
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Haryana, male members elect women to reserved seats instead of hosting democratic 
elections. (M.S., 2000) In these cases, the true policymaking power lies with the men 
who control the women figureheads. Another major problem is the two child norm that 
does not allow women with more than two children to enter into politics, thereby limiting 
many women from participating and perpetuating female child mortality. (Buch, 2006) 
There is a lack of true decentralization from the state to the local level and many 
panchayat leaders believe that they have no power due to the state’s institutional 
constraints. (Jayal, 2006) 
 A study by Surat Singh from the Haryana Institute of Rural Development found 
that women in Haryana panchayats were not able to make a significant impact on 
policymaking and the male-dominated status quo remained. (Singh, 2013) Women also 
were not able to levy taxes or raise funds for projects due to the steadfast reluctance of 
men to share any power. (Singh, 2013) Singh concludes that many women 
representatives in panchayats have been able to gain status, but not concrete power to 
effectively implement their policy preferences. (Singh, 2013) Another reason for 
women’s lack of power is the age-old tradition of unelected all-male village councils 
called khap panchayats who hold de facto lawmaking power. In an interview, a member 
of one of largest khaps, Raghuvir Nain, said, “Not once has the decision of the khap been 
overridden in this village. If anyone wants to challenge a decision they are free to go to 
the courts in this country. India’s judicial system is notoriously slow and prone to 
corruption, so for many, the khap system is the only solution.” (Kumar, 2012, p.3) 
Haryana has failed to pass or change policies to stop these khaps from gaining power and 
they continue to perpetuate gender bias and discrimination by denying rape charges and 
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forcing women to practice purdah27. (Kumar, 2012) Women’s lack of power in Haryana 
may be one of the reasons for high female child mortality. A study by George and 
Dahiya, 1998, concluded that “41 percent of the female early neonatal deaths are due to 
direct female infanticide and excess female child mortality is caused by indirect 
infanticide and neglect.” (George, 1998, p.14) This is especially bad in upper classes 
where a sex ratio of 1.27 from 1993-1998 meant that 16.8% of female fetuses were 
aborted at that time. (George, 1998)  
 The state of Haryana has attempted to reduce female child mortality through 
various schemes and policies, but due to ongoing cultural and institutional constraints on 
women politicians, these policies have not had a significant impact. Even policies such as 
the 2015 Haryana Panchayati Raj Ordinance, which was meant to emphasize women’s 
education, result in increasing male power due to the state’s deeply ingrained patriarchal 
society. The ordinance requires that only educated candidates contest in panchayat 
elections and therefore attempts to place more value on women’s education. (Sehgal, 
2015) However, this backfired when men began to marry educated women to control as 
figureheads in reserved positions. Additionally, besides educational qualifications, the 
ordinance requires candidates to prove payment of electricity bills, not have any bank 
loans, and have a working toilet. (Sehgal, 2015) These requirements make it hard for 
women without training or financial assets to compete in elections and further 
disempower them. Other ineffective initiatives by the state include cash transfer programs 
to stop female child mortality. The state passed the Apni Beti Apna Dhan initiative in 
                                               
27 The practice among women in certain Muslim and Hindu societies of living in a separate room or behind 
a curtain, or of dressing in all-enveloping clothes, in order to stay out of the sight of men or strangers (BBC 
News, 2017). 
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1994 where poor families receive 25,000 rupees if they educate their daughters and do 
not marry them off before their 18th birthdays. (Jejeebhoy, 2015) The Devirupak Scheme 
was passed in 2002 and provides cash transfers for families that choose to get sterilized 
after their first child. (Kalsi, 2017) Lastly, the Ladli Scheme was passed in 2005 and 
provides money for second girl children born after 2005. (Jejeebhoy, 2015) A serious 
flaw that makes all of these programs highly ineffective is that they target only lower-
income households, while higher-income households are the ones practicing female child 
mortality to a greater extent. (Miller, 2001) Upper-class families in Haryana are the ones 
with high rates of feticide and infanticide and the programs do not target these families. 
(Miller, 2001) A 2001 study in Haryana found that the sex ratio at birth for upper caste 
women was 127 males for 100 females, compared with 102 with lower caste women. 
(Miller, 2001) While cash transfers successfully improve school enrollment and 
immunization rates for girls, they do not directly address parent’s demand for sons and 
gender-biased discrimination. The combination of women’s lack of political power and 
ineffective programs results in an unbalanced juvenile sex ratio in Haryana and the 
continued prevalence of female child mortality.   
  
6. Conclusion  
This paper demonstrates that simply descriptive representation in India does not provide 
women with the capacity to advocate for pro-female issues such as female child 
mortality. There is a relationship between an increase in women representatives and their 
preferences towards helping women and children, but they are constrained by social, 
economic, and political impediments. In order for women to have substantive 
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representation and see policy outcomes, they must be given equal standing in politics and 
society and be provided with the training and skills needed to excel in their positions.  
 I analyze the effects of political reservations of women on female child mortality 
using data from the Panchayati Raj amendment in India. The variable of female child 
mortality is a proxy for the substantive representation of women office-holders and their 
ability to administer pro-female programs and policies. I find that having a political 
representation of women at the local level does not have a significant relationship with 
female child mortality rates at the national level. In order to analyze policy 
implementation at the state level, I conducted case studies of Kerala, a state where 
reservations made a large impact on average female child mortality and Haryana, where 
reservations did not have a big impact. Kerala was successful in reducing female child 
mortality through decentralization to developmental programs and self-help groups run 
by women. This resulted in women being able to administer their own programs and 
pursue their policy preferences. On the other hand, women in Haryana were severely 
restricted in policy implementation and schemes to reduce child mortality were only 
targeted towards the poor and ignored the upper classes. Understanding the limitations of 
simply adding a number of women to local government without empowerment is an 
important first step in determining women’s potential and actual impact on decision-
making. The representation of women should be approached in a holistic manner in order 
for them to be able to pass pro-female policies that will improve human development 
indicators such as female child mortality. Even when such policies are passed, women 
must have the power to implement and fund their policy preferences in order for them to 
be effective.  
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Appendix: Data Sources  
A Series: General Population Tables, published by the Office of the Registrar 
 General & Census Commissioner, India. 
 
Birth Rate, Death Rate, Natural Growth Rate, Infant Mortality Rate & Total Fertility 
 Rate by Residence for States/UTs (1972 to 2011), published by Planning 
 Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.  
 
Causes of Death Statistics: Sample Registration System, published by the Office of 
 the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India. 
 
Compendium of India’s Fertility and Mortality Indicators, 1971-2013: Sample 
 Registration System, published by the Office of the Registrar General & Census 
 Commissioner, India. 
 
C Series: Social and Cultural Tables, published by the Office of the Registrar 
 General & Census Commissioner, India.  
 
DLHS Household Survey: Health Management Information System, published by 
 the National Health Mission of Health & Family Welfare, Government of  India.  
 
Economic Surveys of India (1987-2007): Union Budget and Economic Survey, 
 Ministry of Finance, Government of India.  
 
Elementary Education in India: Progress Towards UEE, published by the National 
 University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi.  
 
F Series: Fertility Tables, published by the Office of the Registrar General & Census 
 Commissioner, India.  
 
Gross State Domestic Product at Constant 2004-05 Prices and % Growth YoY (2004-05 
 to 2013-14), published by Planning Commission, Government of India, New 
 Delhi.  
 
India- Macro- economic Summary: 1990-00 to 2014-15, published by Planning 
 Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.  
 
India: Data, The World Bank Group.  
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Infant Mortality Rates for States & UTs-Male, Female, & Total (1961, 2006, 2008, 
 2011, 2012), published by Planning Commission, Government of India, New 
 Delhi.  
 
National Family Health Survey, 2016: Health Management Information System, 
 published by the National Health Mission of Health & Family Welfare, 
 Government of India.  
 
 State-wise Gini Co-efficient of Distribution of Consumption (73 to 11): published 
 by Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.  
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Table 1 
 Dates of Panchayati Raj Implementation Across States in India 
  
States 
Year of 
Reservation 
 
 
Andhra Pradesh  1995 
Assam 2000 
Bihar  2001 
Gujarat  1995 
Haryana 1994 
Karnataka 1993 
Kerala  1995 
Madhya Pradesh 1994 
Maharashtra 1992 
Orissa 1992 
Punjab  1998 
Rajasthan  1995 
Tamil Nadu  1996 
Uttar Pradesh  1995 
West Bengal  1993 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
      Demographic 
& Economic 
control 
variables 
(1987-2007) Obs Mean S.D.  Min Max  
 
      
Population 315 57341172 33762492 14591108 186755000 
GDP  315 93303 85583 4685 594832 
Literacy Rates  315 61 13 35 93 
Female Chief 
Minister  315 0 0 0 1 
Average 
MPCE 
(rupees) 315 569 296 162 1666 
Fertility28  315 3 1 2 6 
Birth Rate29  315 27 18 15 328 
Male Infant 
Mortality30  315 66 24 9 137 
      Female Sex 
Selection Data  
      
     Female Child 
Mortality 31 315 23 10 2 2 
Female Infant 
Mortality32  315 68 24 9 128 
Female Death 
Rate33  315 8 2 5 15 
 
 
 
                                               
28 Number of children born per woman per year (x 1000)  
29 Number of live births during the year per mid-year population  (x 1000) 
 
30 Number of male infant deaths during the year per number of male live births  (x 1000) 
31 Number of female deaths per mid-year female population of children age 0-4 (x 1000) 
 
32 Number of female infant deaths during the year per number of female live births  (x 1000) 
33 Number of female deaths during the year Per mid-year population (x 1000)   
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Table 3 
Women’s Political Reservations and Female Child Mortality in India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Numbers in brackets indicate the standard deviation of the variable  
• *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
• Regression for 15 major states and years 1987-2007. Each cell represents the 
coefficient on the post-reform dummy for the outcome variables. Post-reform 
dummy equals 1 for years after the first local government elections with 
reservations for women.  
• Includes state and fixed year effects  
  
 
Female Child Mortality  
  Reservation 0.212 
 
[0.383] 
Population  ***-0.0000000921 
 
[2.39e-08] 
Literacy  ***-0.248 
 
[0.049] 
MPCE ***0.00265 
 
[0.00079] 
Female Chief 
Minister  -0.459 
 
[0.434] 
Fertility  ***1.955 
 
[0.768] 
Male Infant Mortality  ***0.2603 
 
[0.183] 
  
  State Fixed Effect  X 
Year Fixed Effect  X 
  
  
  R- Squared  0.858 
Number of 
observations 315 
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Table 4 
Women’s Political Reservations and Female Child Mortality by States of India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Number of female deaths per mid year female population of children ages 0-4 
•  (x 1000)  
• Demographic & economic controls include GDP, literacy, monthly per capita 
expenditure, presence of a female chief minister, fertility, and male infant 
mortality  
• *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
State 
Pre-
Reservation 
Average 
Female 
Child 
Mortality  
Post 
Reservation 
Average 
Female Child 
Mortality  Difference  
Percent 
Change (%) 
     Andhra 
Pradesh  22.72 16.18 6.54 28.79 
Assam  29.08 21.22 7.86 27.03 
Bihar  30.82 29.81 1.01 3.27 
Gujarat  28.19 19.51 8.68 30.79 
Haryana 27.58 22.49 5.09 18.46 
Karnataka 23.86 16.31 7.54 31.62 
Kerala  5.54 2.91 2.63 47.51 
Madhya 
Pradesh  47.56 31.56 16.00 33.65 
Maharashtra 19.45 12.14 7.31 37.59 
Orissa 41.85 27.47 14.39 34.37 
Punjab  20.56 15.36 5.20 25.29 
Rajasthan  36.69 27.56 9.12 24.87 
Tamil Nadu  18.08 11.26 6.83 37.76 
Uttar Pradesh  44.11 29.66 14.45 32.75 
West Bengal  22.40 14.21 8.19 36.58 
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Figure 1 
 Nationwide Trends in Female Child Mortality (1987-2007) 
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Figure 2:  
Nationwide Trends in Sex Ratio at Birth (1999-2012)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
865
870
875
880
885
890
895
900
905
910
915
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Sex Ratio (females per 1000 males) by 
Birth 
Years  
  
Sharma 53 
Figure 3:  
Kerala Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Reservations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each point on the graph represents the impact of women's representation on female child mortality 
after a given number of years. The zero point on the X-axis represents the year of the reform; the dates of 
reform vary across states as documented in Table 1.  
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Figure 4:  
Haryana Year-by-Year Effects of Women’s Reservations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each point on the graph represents the impact of women's representation on female child mortality 
after a given number of years. The zero point on the X-axis represents the year of the reform; the dates of 
reform vary across states as documented in Table 1.  
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